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Abstract—This paper proposes an anomaly-based Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS), which flags anomalous network traffic 
with a distance-based classifier. A polynomial approach was 
designed and applied in this work to extract hidden correlations 
from traffic related statistics in order to provide distinguishing 
features for detection. The proposed IDS was evaluated using the 
well-known KDD Cup 99 data set. Evaluation results show that 
the proposed system achieved better detection rates on KDD Cup 
99 data set in comparison with another two state-of-the-art 
detection schemes. Moreover, the computational complexity of 
the system has been analysed in this paper and shows similar to 
the two state-of-the-art schemes. 
Keywords—Intrusion Detection System (IDS); polynomial; 
feature correlation analysis; Mahalanobis distance; computational 
complexity  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, intrusion detection techniques have been 
extensively studied. Traditionally, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) are divided into two categories, namely signature-based 
(or misused-based) detection and anomaly-based detection. 
Signature-based detection maintains a database of signatures. It 
looks for specific signatures in incoming traffic and compares 
them with the one in the signature base. When a match is 
found, it raises an alert. Signature-based detection has high 
accuracy rate with a low false positive rate in detecting known 
attacks. However, it is incapable of detecting unknown (i.e. 
zero-day) or polymorphic attacks (i.e. the variants of the attack) 
for which the signatures are not yet available and not included 
in the signature base.  Anomaly-based detection has attracted 
the attention of many researchers [1-4], and it overcomes the 
weakness of signature-based IDSs in detecting novel attacks 
and many variants of such attacks. Firstly, an anomaly-based 
detection creates a base-line profile of normal network traffic. 
Then it compares an incoming traffic profile against the normal 
traffic profiles. A significant deviation from the normal traffic 
profiles is identified as an attack.  
 Machine learning techniques have been widely used in 
detecting network anomalies because machine learning can 
construct models automatically based on the given training 
data. Machine learning techniques have achieved good 
performance on anomaly-based detection systems. Some 
typical methods used in network traffic anomaly detection 
include Bayesian networks [5], support vector machine [6], 
artificial neural network [7], fuzzy logical [8], genetic 
algorithm [9], decision trees [10]. Even though machine 
learning techniques obtain good results on anomaly-based 
detection, they encounter relatively high false positive rates due 
to correlations between traffic records or features are ignored 
or less used. 
However, some recent work presented in scholarly 
literature has suggested multivariate correlation analysis for 
traffic features extraction. Yu et al. [11] proposed a scheme to 
discriminate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 
from flash crowds by analysing the flow correlation coefficient 
among suspicious flow. Tavallaee M et al. [12] proposed an 
anomaly detection scheme using the correlation information 
contained in groups of network traffic samples. The main idea 
is to compare the signs in the covariance matrix of a group of 
sequential samples with the signs in the covariance matrix of 
the normal data obtained during the training process. Jin et al. 
[13] constructed a covariance feature space. The correlation 
differences of sequential samples are utilized for identifying 
network attacks. The approach improved detection accuracy. It 
is, however, vulnerable to any attack which is a linear change 
of features. Such that Tan et al. [14, 15] suggested to extract 
2 
 
the correlative information between features using triangle 
area. The approach proposed in [14] is summarised as follows. 
 Given an arbitrary data set 1 2{ , , , }nX x x x=  , where
1 2{ , , , }
i i i
i mx f f f=   , (1 )i n≤ ≤  represents the i-th m-
dimensional traffic record. First, the vector ix  is projected on a 
2-Dimensional (2D) Euclidean subspace [ , ]i i Tj kf f  , 
(1 ,1 , )j m k m j k≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≠ . Then, the area of triangle i ij kf Of  
(O is the origin) is calculated, which is 2/|)||(| ik
i
j ff × . So, in 
the vector ix  , the correlation between 
i
jf and ikf  can be 
expressed by 2/|)||(| ik
i
j ff × . To make a complete analysis, 
all possible combinations of any two features are computed.  
With this approach, however, feature correlation 
information may be partially lost due to the fact that given any 
single feature with the value zero in a pair, the size of such a 
constructed triangle area is zero. Therefore, this issue has an 
unneglectable impact on detection accuracy.  
In fact, the correlation of two features can be represented 
by any polynomial of them, such as 
i i
j kf f× , 
i
k
i
j ff +  , 
i
k
i
j ff − ,
i
k
i
j ff / , and 
2( )i ij kf f+ . It is worth noticing that the size of a 
triangle area formed by ijf and ikf equals to half of the 
magnitude of the outer product of vectors [ ijf , 0]T and [0, ikf ]T 
on 2D Euclidean subspace  [ , ]i i Tj kf f . Theoretically, the 
feature correlation extraction approach suggested in [14] can be 
improved by taking these forms of polynomial into account. 
Based on afford-discussion, in this paper, we proposed an 
approach using polynomial expression for feature correlations. 
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  Section II 
proposes a polynomial expression of feature correlation 
method. Section III describes intrusion detection mechanism 
based on Mahalanobis distance. Section IV presents 
experimental results. Finally, the computational complexity of 
our proposed intrusion detection system is analysed in Section 
V, and Section VI concludes the paper with future works. 
II. FEATURE CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
The behaviour of network attack traffic is different from 
that of normal traffic. These differences can be reflected by 
statistical properties. In this section, we propose a new 
approach to reveal feature correlation using different forms of 
polynomial. The detailed approaches are presented below.  
Given an arbitrary data set 1 2{ , , , }nX x x x=  , where
1 2{ , , , }
i i i
i mx f f f=  , (1 )i n≤ ≤ represents the i-th m-dimensional 
traffic record. The correlation of any two features ijf and ikf in 
the vector ix  can be shown by a polynomial. For instance,
i
k
i
j ff × , ikij ff +  , ikij ff − , ikij ff /  or ikij ff +2)( . Moreover, 
considering the fact of equality status between features, a 
feature whose value could be zero or possible negative after 
subtraction, we choose ik
i
j ff × or 
i
k
i
j ff + to present feature 
correlation. If ik
i
j ff ×  is used, the correlations between features 
can expressed by 
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For simplification, 
i i
j kf f×  is denoted by 
i
jkp . Then, (1) 
is now shown as  
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In the same way, if ik
i
j ff + is used to present the feature 
correlation and denoted as mija , the correlation between features 
can be shown as 
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Clearly, (1), (2) and (3) are symmetric matrices along their 
main diagonal, and the elements on main diagonal are 
insignificant in revealing the correlations between features. So,
one only needs to consider either the lower triangles or the 
upper triangles of these matrices. 
 Given the correlations between features are presented by 
i
k
i
j ff × , the vector ix the correlations between 
i
jf and ikf  can 
be shown as the following matrix 
21
1 2
0 0 0
0 0
(4)
0
i
i i
m m
p
p p
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in which the elements in the upper triangle and on the main 
diagonal are not considered and set to zeros. This matrix can 
then be transformed into vector (5). 
21 1 32 2 1[ ]
i i i i i i
l m m mmP p p p p p −=                     (5) 
 For data set 1 2{ , , , }nX x x x=  , the multivariate correlations 
can be presented by 
],,,[ 21 nlll PPPX =                          (6)               
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 In the same way, if the feature correlations are presented 
by ik
i
j ff + , the corresponding matrix is 
],,,[ 21 nlll AAAX =                        (7)                                                                                            
If the feature correlation is expressed by ik
i
j ff × , the 
difference in feature correlation between our proposed method 
and triangle area method in [14] is constant coefficient , which 
is ½ and it does not affect the detection performance. 
Therefore, the computation of the feature correlation can be 
reduced if triangle areas is replaced with ik
i
j ff ×  .  Since the 
replacement reduces only the computational complexity and 
causes no impact on detection performance, ik
i
j ff × will not 
be examined in the following sections. 
III. DETECTION MECHANISM 
A. Normal traffic profile 
A normal traffic profile is generated using purely 
legitimated network traffic records. After a normal traffic 
profile is established, abnormal network traffic can be detected 
by evaluating a new incoming traffic against the normal traffic 
profile, which presumably represents normal network traffic. 
Now we introduce the processing of normal traffic profiles. 
First, feature correlations between features of n normal training 
samples are computed. According to feature correlation 
analysis in section II, the lower triangle matrix of i-th sample 
can be expressed by the following vectors 
, , , , , ,
21 1 32 2 1[ ]
nor i nor i nor i nor i nor i nor i
l m m mmP p p p p p −=     
For data set ],,,[ 21
nor
n
nornornor xxxX = , we have 
],,,[ ,2,1, nnorl
nor
l
nor
l
nor PPPP =                    (8) 
In order to compute the covariance matrix of features, we 
consider the matrix given in (4). Firstly, for any nonzero 
elements j kp  and stp in (4), we compute their expectations 
over n normal training samples respectively, they are 

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==
n
i
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,
1
, 1,1 μμ
     
  (9) 
According to the definition of covariance, the covariance 
between two elements in (5) over n normal training samples is 
, ,
1
1cov( , ) ( )( )
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Therefore the covariance matrix of features is 
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Mahalanobis distance is used to measure the similarity 
between two vectors. When measuring the similarity, 
Mahalanobis distance takes the cross correlation between 
different variables into consideration [16]. The smaller the 
Mahalanobis distance between two vectors is, the higher 
similarity they have. 
The Mahalanobis distance between inorlp
, and norlp is 
denoted by 
, , 1 ,( ) ( )nor i nor i nor T nor i norl l l lMD P P Cov P P
−
= − −
       
(12) 
where ,
1
1 nnor nor i
l l
i
P P
n
=
=  . Therefore, normal traffic profiles 
can be described by 

=
=
n
i
inorMD
n 1
,1μ ,  2, )(
1
1 μσ −
−
=
inorMD
n    .  
(13) 
Similarly, for an incoming traffic, we can compute the 
Mahalanobis distance between features using (14). 
1( ) ( )new new new T new newl l l lMD P P Cov P P
−
= − −        (14) 
B. Attack Detection 
Mahalanobis distance is used to measure the similarity 
between the normal traffic profiles and the incoming network 
traffic profiles. The threshold is set to distinguish intrusion 
behaviour from normal traffic. The threshold is set to 
1 2,w wμ ασ μ ασ= − = +                              (15) 
Where, μ  and σ are the expectation and variance of 
normal traffic respectively, α  usually ranges from 1 to 3. For 
a normal distribution, the possibility of traffic falling into the 
interval ( ασμ − , ασμ + ) varies from 68.26% to 99.73% by 
varying α  from 1 to 3. In experiments discussed in Section 
IV, the threshold was varied from 1 to 3 with an increment of 
0.5. 
If the value of newMD falls in the range of 
21 wMDw
new ≤≤ , the new traffic is considered as normal, 
otherwise an attack. 
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The complete framework of our proposed intrusion 
detection system has three steps as shown in Fig.1. In step1, 
basic features are generated from network traffic packets 
captured at the destination network to reduce the overhead of 
detecting malicious activities. These features are used to 
construct records describing statistics characteristic for a well-
defined time interval. In step 2, feature correlation for 
individual records is generated by a polynomial method, 
which is used to extract correlation information between 
features. Network intrusion behaviour can cause changes to 
these correlations. So attacks can be detected according to the 
changes of features correlation information. In step 3, an 
anomaly-based detection mechanism is used in making 
decision. Training and test phases are included in this step. In 
training phase, pure legitimate traffics are used to generate 
normal profiles, and they are stored in a data set. 
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Fig.1. Framework of the proposed intrusion detection system 
In test phase, a tested profile is generated for incoming traffic. 
Then the tested profiles are compared with the normal profiles 
which are stored in the dataset. If the Mahalanobis distance 
between them is larger than the threshold, the incoming traffic 
is considered as an attack, otherwise, it is considered as a 
normal traffic. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and measure 
performance of our proposed intrusion detection system, we 
conducted experiments using KDD Cup 99 data set. Though 
the data set is criticised for its redundant records and 
simulation artifacts, researchers have widely used KDD Cup 99 
to evaluate new methods for anomaly detection. Thomas et al. 
have justified the use of this dataset in IDS evaluation [17]. In 
our experiments, we used the 10% labelled subset of KDD Cup 
99 data set. DoS attacks (Back, Land, Neptune, Pod, Smurf, 
Teardrop attacks) are detected. A cross-validation is conducted 
on the dataset to evaluate the detection performance.  
A. Traffic characterization of polynomial correlation 
In KDD Cup 99 data set, there are 41 features, of which 9 
are discrete and 32 are continuous. Feature correlations were 
extracted from the 32 continuous features. These feature 
correlation matrices of several types of traffic are visualised 
and shown in Fig. 2. These matrices illustrate the feature 
correlations of normal TCP, Land and Smurf attack traffic.  
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the feature correlations of each type 
of traffic are presented using a pair of figures, which show the 
triangle-area-based correlation matrix and addition-based 
correlation matrix respectively. In Fig.2, nz stands for non-zero 
element, whose value indicates the number of non-zero 
elements in a matrix. 
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 2, the correlation matrices are 
symmetric along their main diagonal. The non-zero elements in 
the addition-based correlation matrices (b), (d) and (f) 
outnumber those in the corresponding triangle-area-based 
correlation matrices (a), (c) and (e). This demonstrates 
empirically that the proposed addition-based feature correlation 
approach results in less information loss in comparison with 
triangle-area based approach. 
Further, when the feature correlation is expressed by the 
addition, such as ik
i
j ff +
2)( , their correlation matrix shows 
the same pattern as their counterpart of addition-based 
correlation )( ik
i
j ff + .  This is because the numbers of non-
zero elements are same in both cases. 
   
(a) Triangle-area-based correlation  (b) Addition-based correlation 
Normal TCP record 
    
(c) Triangle-area-based correlation  (d) Addition-based correlation 
 Land attack record 
 
(e) Triangle-area-based correlation  (f) Addition-based correlation 
 Smurf attack record 
Fig. 2. Matrix visualization of feature correlation of Normal TCP attack, 
Land, and Smurf attack records.  
Step 1: 
Feature Generation 
for individual 
Records 
Step 2: 
Generation of 
Polynomial Feature 
Correlation for 
Individual Records 
 
 
Normal Profile 
Generation  
Tested Profile 
Generation  
Attack 
Detection 
    Step 3: Making Decision 
Network
Traffic 
Training 
Phase 
Test 
Phase 
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B. Detection Performance and Analysis 
To evaluate the detection performance of our proposed 
IDS, 10-fold cross validation was used. In 10-fold cross 
validation, samples are randomly partitioned into 10 equal 
sized data sets. Of the 10 data sets, a single data set is retained 
as the validation data for testing the model, and the remaining 9 
data sets are used as training data. The cross-validation process 
is then repeated 10 times (ten folds), with each of the 10 data 
sets used exactly once as the validation data. The advantage of 
this method over repeated random sub-sampling is that all 
observations are used for both training and validation, and each 
observation is used for validation exactly once. 
The detection performance comparison of our proposed 
IDS is shown in Table 1.  In Table 1, TrA denotes the triangle-
area-based approach [14], and ADD denotes the proposed 
addition-based approach.  
Table 1 shows that both approaches could achieve 
approximately a 99.88% Detection Rate (DR) on normal 
traffic. The ADD could detection all the attacks. However, the 
TrA only achieved 100% DRs on Back and Smurf attacks. For 
Neptune and Pod, the TrA could detect close to 100%, but the 
DR on Land drops drastically from 91.43% to 80.48% along 
the increase of the threshold. The possible reason is that, if the 
features whose values are zero multiply the features whose 
values are not zero, the results are zero. So when feature 
correlation expressed by a triangle area method, part of the 
correlation information is lost. This leads to some attacks go 
un-detected.  
TABLE 1. DETECTION PERFORMANCE (%) COMPARISON BETWEEN TRIANGLE- 
AREA-BASED FEATURE CORRELATION AND ADDITION-BASED FEATURE 
CORRELATION AGAINST DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS 
  
Table 2 shows the comparison between the overall 
detection accuracy of the TrA approach and that of the ADD 
approach against different thresholds. The values of the 
evaluation metrics, namely DR, False Positive Rate (FPR) and 
accuracy, were computed for all attacks regardless their types.  
 TABLE 2. ACCURACY (%)  COMPARISON BETWEEN TRIANGLE-AREA-BASED 
FEATURE CORRELATION AND ADDITIONAL-BASED FEATURE CORRELATION 
AGAINST DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS 
   Thresholds 1σ  1.5σ  2σ  2.5σ  3σ  
TrA ADD TrA ADD TrA ADD TrA ADD TrA ADD
FPR 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13
DR 99.99 100 99.99 100 99.99 100 99.98 100 99.98 100 
Accuracy 99.94 99.94 99.94 99.94 99.94 99.94 99.93 99.94 99.93 99.94
 
The overall DR of the TrA shown in Table 2 varies from 
99.98% to 99.99%. However, the DR of ADD remains steady 
at 100% along with the change of the threshold. For both the 
TrA and the ADD, the accuracy stays around 99.94% for all 
cases. 
To provide a fair evaluation, the proposed ADD-based IDS 
is compared not only with our previous research work [14], but 
also with two other state-of-the-art detection approach, namely, 
triangle-area-based nearest neighbours approach [18], based on 
Euclidean distance map approach[19] .  
The DR and FPR for DoS attacks of these four IDSs are 
shown in Table 3 respectively. As it can be seen from Table 3 
that, our proposed addition-based IDS achieved the best results 
on KDD Cup 99 data set with a 100% DR and a 0.13% FPR, 
which is better than Triangle-Area-based correlation approach. 
Although the other two IDSs could achieved above a 99% DR, 
their FPR on the same evaluation data was far much higher. 
TABLE 3. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH OTHER DETECTION APPROACH 
 
 
The Proposed 
IDS 
(Threshold=1σ)
Triangle Area 
Based Nearest 
Neighbours 
Approach [18] 
Approach Based 
on Euclidean 
Distance Map [19]
Triangle-Area 
-Based 
Correlation 
Approach [14] 
(Threshold=1σ )
FPR 0.13% 2.99%  2.08% 1.26% 
DR 100% 99.27%  99.96% 99.97% 
V. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, an analysis is conducted on the 
computational complexity of our proposed approach. For a 
traffic record with m features, operations are involved in each 
computation of a complete feature correlation extraction for 
both triangle-area-based and addition-based approaches with 
the data set. Therefore, the computational complexity of 
feature polynomial expression is 2( )O m . Being worth noticing 
that the feature correlation matrix is a symmetric matrix and 
the elements along the main diagonal of the matrix are zeros. 
The time for computation can be reduced by more than 50% 
when it is put into practice. However, the computational 
complexity cannot be reduced.  
In the process of making decision, the Mahalanobis 
distance between the incoming traffic profile and the normal 
traffic profile needs to be calculated to evaluate the 
dissimilarity between them. As Mahalanobis distance incurs a 
complexity of )( 2MO , where ( 1) / 2M m m= −  and is the 
dimension of ilP , the computational complexity of 
Mahalanobis distance becomes 4( )O m .  
Therefore, when taking the computational complexity of 
feature correlation extraction and making decision into 
account, the overall complexity of our proposed intrusion 
detection system becomes 2 4 4( ) ( ) ( )O m O m O m+ = . However, in 
this work, m is a fixed number (m=32). So, the computational 
complexity of our proposed approach is O (1). 
From the above analysis, the proposed approach does not 
change the complexity in [14]. The computational complexity 
of two state-of-the-art detection systems is shown in Table 4. 
In triangle area based nearest neighbours approach, l is the 
Type of 
Records 
Thresholds 
1σ  1.5 σ  2 σ  2.5σ   3 σ  
TrA ADD TrA ADD TrA ADD TrA ADD TrA ADD
Normal 99.88 99.87 99.89 99.87 99.89 99.87 99.89 99.87 99.89 99.87
Back 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Neptune 99.99 100 99.99 100 99.99 100 98.16 100 98.16 100 
Land 91.43 100 84.76 100 81.43 100 80.95 100 80.48 100 
Pod 99.55 100 99.47 100 99.47 100 99.32 100 99.32 100 
Smurf 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Teardrop 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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number of clusters used in generating triangle areas, and n is 
the number of training samples. The detailed computational 
complexity analysis of this approach can be found in [14]. 
TABLE 4. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF DIFFERENT DETECTION 
APPROACHES 
The 
Proposed 
Approach 
Triangle Area 
Based Nearest 
Neighbours 
Approach [18] 
Approach Based on 
Euclidean Distance 
Map [19] 
Triangle-Area 
-based 
Correlation 
Approach[14] 
O(1) O(l2n2) O(1) O(1) 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we proposed an anomaly-based detection 
mechanism using polynomial feature correlation technique.  
Compared with triangle area method, our approach is intuitive 
and simple without losing correlation information between 
features. Moreover, polynomial form is easy to be changed for 
observing the role of some features. Evaluations were 
conducted using the KDD CUP 99 data set to verify the 
effectiveness and performance of our proposed detection 
method. Experimental results show that our approach has high 
detection rate while maintaining very low false positive rates. 
We also analysed the computation complexity of our proposed 
method. As a part of our work in the future, we will test our 
detection system with real-world traffic. 
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